

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Dear Allen:

In considering the causes of the renewed Geneva negotiation with the Soviets, it is apparent that we will be faced with the specific problem of coming to an arrangement which might in fact constitute only a "moratorium" probably for a two to two and a half year period with respect to the status of Berlin. In order to judge intelligently the position the United States Government should take, it will be necessary that we be able to answer the question: "would the United States and its allies be in a better or worse position to negotiate on Berlin in 1961/2 than in 1959?" In this connection it would be necessary to consider inter alia the effect on the West Berliners and the World generally of allied agreement in 1959 to a two year, more or less, Berlin moratorium. Would this be regarded as an allied victory or defeat? How would the West Berliners react to the uncertain prospect of another round on Berlin in 1961/2? The basic decision however would probably still have to be made on the basis of the anticipated comparative strength of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

It appears that because of lack of access to our basic war planning neither the USIB nor any other existing governmental machinery is competent to tackle this problem.

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
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Dear Allen:

In considering the course of the present Geneva negotiations with the Soviets, it is apparent that we will be faced with the specific problem of coming to an arrangement which might in fact constitute only a "moratorium" probably for a two to two and a half year period with respect to the status of Berlin. In order to judge intelligently the position the United States Government should take, it will be necessary that we be able to answer the question: "Would the United States and its allies be in a better or worse position to negotiate on Berlin in 1961/2 than in 1959?" In this connection it would be necessary to consider inter alia the effect on the West Berliners and the USSR generally of allied agreement in 1959 to a two-year, more or less, Berlin moratorium. Would this be regarded as an allied victory or defeat? How would the West Berliners react to the certain prospect of another round on Berlin in 1961/2? The basic decision, however, would probably still have to be made on the basis of the anticipated comparative strengths of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

It appears that because of lack of access to our basic war planning, neither the USIS nor any other existing governmental machinery is competent to tackle this problem.

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.



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Serial # NND 87248
Date May 1st 1989

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NND 87248

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this problem. It further appear that it will accordingly be necessary to set up a special ad hoc group consisting of appropriate representatives of Defense, CIA, and State if we are to try to come up with any evaluation of this question. Unfortunately, time passes and it would be necessary that this be done on a crash basis. I should have to have such a report in my hands in Geneva by mid-July, even though it might not be ideally desirable.

I should accordingly be grateful if you would immediately designate preferably not more than three officers from the Central Intelligence Agency to join a similar member from Department of Defense and State in undertaking such a study as a matter of great urgency.

For my part I would propose to designate as our principal representatives Mr. Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the position. It appears that it will undoubtedly be necessary to set up a Special Ad hoc group consisting of representatives of Defense, Army and Navy to try to come up with any conclusion on this question. Unfortunately, this process and it would be necessary that this be done on a crash basis. I should have to have such a report in my hands in time by mid-July, even though it might not be as thorough a study as would be [REDACTED] desirable.

I should appreciate the position as you would [REDACTED] understand, however, that not more than three officers from the Central Intelligence Agency be given a chance to present their arguments and position and that the remaining four or five be given a [REDACTED] chance to argue.

I am enclosing a detailed letter to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Macmillan.

Very truly yours I would appreciate your comments on our proposed arrangement for the High Committee, Director of Intelligence and Defense.

[REDACTED]

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ROBERT MURPHY
Acting Secretary

MR. FISCHLER/acs (a/s)
July 2, 1959

Cleared in substance:

S/P - Mr. Matheson
IMR - Mr. Arneson
WDR - Mr. Merchant

S/S - RO

[REDACTED]

JUL 3 1959

A facsimile of signed original

[Signature]

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